Rules and research
EU reports on foreign information manipulation and interference
Short answer
- Publisher
- European External Action Service (EEAS) 3
- Latest report
- 4th report, March 2026, covering 1 January to 31 December 2025 3
- Incidents in latest report
- 540 3
- Attribution, 2025
- 29 percent Russia, 6 percent China, 65 percent unattributed 3
What FIMI means
FIMI is the EU term for foreign information manipulation and interference. The EEAS reports count incidents, the channels behind them and the people and bodies they target 2. The 3rd report says the final decision on attribution is often political 2.
The reports name Russia as the main actor and China as a secondary one 2. EUvsDisinfo says nearly half of the incidents in the 4th report were linked to specific developments such as elections, protests or international crises 4.
The reports compared
Each report covers a different period and uses a different sample, so figures should not be added together or read as a trend without the EEAS caveats 1,23.
| Report | Published | Period covered | Incidents | Channels |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2nd report 1 | January 2024 1 | 1 December 2022 to 30 November 2023 1 | 750 1 | Around 4,000, more than 4,000 in the executive summary 1 |
| 3rd report 2 | March 2025 2 | 4 November 2023 to 4 November 2024 2 | 505 2 | 38,000 unique channels on 25 platforms 2 |
| 4th report 3 | March 2026 3 | 1 January to 31 December 2025 3 | 540 3 | 10,500 unique channels, approximately 10,000 in chapter 3 3 |
Targets and platforms
The 2nd report found 53 countries targeted, with Ukraine most targeted in 160 cases 1. Telegram was used 496 times and X 452 times 1.
The 3rd report found 90 countries and 322 organisations targeted. Ukraine was the main target with 257 incidents. France had 152 and Germany 73 2. X accounted for 88 percent of detected activity 2.
The 4th report found more than 100 countries and around 200 organisations targeted. The most targeted within the EEAS perimeter were Ukraine, France, Moldova and Germany 3. It found 88 percent of instances on X, with Telegram central for Ukraine and Eastern Europe and Facebook used for African audiences 3.
How channels are classified
The 3rd report introduced a FIMI Exposure Matrix with four categories, by how closely a channel is tied to a state 2. It says classifications can change as new evidence emerges 2.
- State official channels: government and diplomatic accounts, overt and attributed 2
- State-controlled outlets: media funded, managed and editorially controlled by the state 2
- State-linked channels: covert channels attributed to a threat actor through stronger evidence, often from proprietary or classified sources 2
- State-aligned channels: covert channels showing alignment with a state without enough evidence for formal attribution 2
AI, elections and new tools
The 2nd report found fewer than 20 of 750 cases involved AI-generated media 1. The 3rd report found about 41 cases 2. The 4th report found 147 cases, 27 percent of incidents, in its main text. Its executive summary says one in four 3.
The 3rd report recorded 42 Russian FIMI cases around the June 2024 European Parliament elections 2. The 4th report says elections in Germany, Poland, Romania, Moldova, the Czech Republic and Côte d'Ivoire were targeted in 2025 3.
The 4th report introduced a FIMI Deterrence Playbook, which maps sanctions, law enforcement, digital regulation and resilience tools to each phase of an operation 3. EUvsDisinfo says the report presents the FIMI Galaxy Explorer, a public interactive dashboard 4.
Common questions
How many FIMI incidents did the EEAS record in 2025?
540, in its 4th report published in March 2026 3.
Does the EEAS attribute every incident?
No. In 2025, 65 percent remained unattributed, with 29 percent attributed to Russia and 6 percent to China 3.
Can the reports show long-term trends?
The EEAS says its data reflects a limited subset of activity and should not be used to draw conclusions about general FIMI trends 2.
What is the FIMI Exposure Matrix?
A four-level classification of channels from state official to state-aligned, set out in the 3rd report 2.
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Sources
- EEAS: 2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats: A Framework for Networked Defence (January 2024)
- EEAS: 3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats, Exposing the architecture of FIMI operations (March 2025)
- EEAS: 4th EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats, Dismantling the FIMI House of Cards (March 2026)
- EUvsDisinfo: 4th EEAS Report on FIMI Threats, Dismantling the FIMI house of cards (17 March 2026)
Related
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- Research datasets on influence operations
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