Reported networks
Influence operations targeting elections
Short answer
- EEAS, 2023 report period
- 33 election-related incidents across nine elections 8
- EEAS, European Parliament 2024
- 42 Russian FIMI cases 9
- OpenAI, 2024
- Four networks with some election content, all rated Breakout Category Two 4
- Meta, Romania
- 658 Facebook accounts, about $177,000 in ads, Q1 2025 3
Domestic networks
Many election networks in platform reports originate inside the country they target. Meta said in May 2024 that the majority of EU-focused inauthentic behaviour it had disrupted so far was domestic, and that most clusters focused on local elections 1.
Meta's Q1 2024 report linked a Bangladesh network covering elections to individuals associated with the Awami League party and a Bangladeshi non-profit 1. It linked a Croatia network focused on national elections to individuals associated with the youth organisation of the HDZ party 1.
Meta's Q1 2025 report described a network that originated in and targeted Romania. It had 658 Facebook accounts and spent about $177,000 on ads 3. Meta said a Ghana-based network linked to the UAE firm DigitSol was removed before the December 2024 election 2.
OpenAI said in October 2024 that a Rwanda-origin network promoting the Rwandan Patriotic Front on X was the only one it saw focused exclusively on elections. It banned the accounts in early July 2024 4.
Foreign networks
Microsoft's Threat Analysis Center said on 9 August 2024 that an Iranian network it calls Storm-2035 ran covert news sites aimed at US voters on both ends of the political spectrum 7. OpenAI reported generated comments and articles about the US election from STORM-2035 in late August 2024 4.
OpenAI said in June 2025 that a Russia-origin case, Helgoland Bite, targeted German-speaking audiences during the 2025 German election through Telegram, X and a Pravda website 5. Google's Q1 2025 bulletin listed YouTube channels, ad accounts and a domain linked to a Germany-based actor posting about German elections 6.
EU election findings
The 2nd EEAS report, covering December 2022 to November 2023, analysed 33 election-related incidents across nine elections, including Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 8.
The 3rd EEAS report recorded 42 Russian FIMI cases around the June 2024 European Parliament elections. It listed Moldova's elections and EU accession referendum, Taiwan's presidential election and the US presidential election among other major targets 9.
The 4th EEAS report, published in March 2026, says Russia targeted elections in Germany, Poland, Romania, Moldova, the Czech Republic and Côte d'Ivoire in 2025 10. It named Armenia's June 2026 parliamentary elections as an upcoming target 10.
Reported reach
OpenAI rates operations on the Breakout Scale, where Category One means spread in one community on one platform. It said all election-related operations it saw in 2024 were Category Two 4. Microsoft said in August 2024 it had not yet seen significant social media amplification of the Storm-2035 sites 7.
Common questions
Are most election influence networks foreign?
Not in Meta's EU data. Meta said in May 2024 that most EU-focused inauthentic behaviour it disrupted was domestic 1.
Did AI-driven operations go viral in 2024 elections?
OpenAI said in October 2024 it had not seen any election-related operation attract viral engagement that year 4.
Which elections did the EEAS say Russia targeted in 2025?
Germany, Poland, Romania, Moldova, the Czech Republic and Côte d'Ivoire, per its March 2026 report 10.
What did Google report about the German elections?
Its Q1 2025 bulletin listed content linked to a Germany-based actor about German elections 6.
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Sources
- Meta: Q1 2024 Adversarial Threat Report (May 2024)
- Meta: Q4 2024 Adversarial Threat Report (February 2025)
- Meta: Adversarial Threat Report, First Quarter 2025 (May 2025)
- OpenAI: Influence and cyber operations: an update (October 2024)
- OpenAI: Disrupting malicious uses of AI: June 2025 (June 2025)
- Google: TAG Bulletin: Q1 2025 (15 May 2025)
- Microsoft Threat Analysis Center: Iran steps into US election 2024 with cyber-enabled influence operations (9 August 2024)
- EEAS: 2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats: A Framework for Networked Defence (January 2024)
- EEAS: 3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats, Exposing the architecture of FIMI operations (March 2025)
- EEAS: 4th EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats, Dismantling the FIMI House of Cards (March 2026)
Related
- What coordinated inauthentic behaviour means
How Meta defines coordinated inauthentic behaviour, how X, TikTok, Bluesky and Microsoft word similar rules, and what Meta has reported since 2017.
- EU reports on foreign information manipulation and interference
What the EEAS reports on foreign information manipulation and interference count, the periods they cover, and how they classify channels.
- Meta's adversarial threat reports explained
What Meta's adversarial threat reports contain, how each network entry is laid out, and what the Q4 2024, Q1 2025 and Q2/Q3 2025 reports listed.
- OpenAI threat reports explained
What OpenAI's reports on disrupting malicious uses of AI contain, how cases are rated on the Breakout Scale, and what the 2024 to 2026 reports found.
- Influence operations targeting Africa
Networks targeting African audiences as reported by Meta, OpenAI, Google, the EEAS and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, with origins as attributed.